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PROCESSING CIVIL RIGHTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND CONSUMER DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Deseriee A. Kennedy*
INTRODUCTION
On March 26, 1995, Denise Arguello and her father, Mr. Govea,
stopped at a Conoco gas station.1 While they were purchasing some
items inside the station store, the cashier referred to Ms. Arguello as a
"f***ing Iranian Mexican bitch," began screaming racist remarks over
the store's intercom, and displayed several crude gestures.2 Ms. Ar-
guello and her father, too disgusted to complete their purchases, left
the store.3 When Mr. Govea attempted to reenter the store, the cash-
ier locked them out, while again laughing and making crude gestures. 4
According to Mr. Govea, the cashier, "admitted she was discriminat-
ing against them as they spoke through the locked door."'5 Ms. Ar-
guello and her father brought suit in a federal district court claiming
the treatment they received violated § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act,
which prohibits discrimination in contracting, and a jury awarded
them $550,000 in damages.6 In response to a motion for judgment as a
matter of law, the district court judge set aside the verdict and the
plaintiffs' claims were dismissed.7 The result in Arguello v. Conoco,
Inc. is in no way atypical. Plaintiffs in consumer discrimination cases
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Emerging Issues in Race and the Law. Portions of this discussion are adapted from Deseriee A.
Kennedy, Consumer Discrimination: The Limitations of Federal Civil Rights Protection, 66 Mo.
L. REV. 275 (2001). Special thanks to Professor Michele Goodwin and the organizers of the
DePaul Law Review Symposium. I would also like to thank Judy Cornett for her insightful
comments, George White for his support, and Casandra Henley for her able research assistance.
I am grateful to the University of Tennessee College of Law summer grant program for support-
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1. Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., No. 3:97-CV-0638-H, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18471, at *2-3 (N.D.
Tex. Nov. 9, 2001). The court identified Ms. Arguello and Mr. Govea as Hispanic. Id. at *2. It
further states, "The Court notes that [the cashier's] version of these events is almost entirely
different." Id. at *3 n.1.
2. Id. at *2-3.
3. Id.
4. Id. at *3.
5. Arguello, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18471, at *3.
6. Id. at *4.
7. Id. at *14.
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face significant substantive and procedural hurdles in articulating via-
ble claims. This Article discusses the way in which the prevailing pro-
cedural standards undermine the ability of plaintiffs to pursue
consumer discrimination claims. It raises the concern that premature
dismissals of these claims unduly silence plaintiffs, hinder the ability of
the Civil Rights Acts to fairly address issues of societal discrimination,
and prevent a broader understanding of the subtle ways in which ra-
cism continues to be manifested.
II. CONSUMER DISCRIMINATION
There are myriad ways in which institutional and individual racism
practices intersect to create and reinforce oppression. Retail settings
are an important situs for social interaction between groups from dif-
fering racial and socioeconomic backgrounds. Consumer discrimina-
tion is representative of the ways in which stereotypical ideas and
beliefs are infused into everyday activities that antidiscrimination
principles find difficult to reach. There are frequent reports of dispa-
rate treatment in stores that reveal that the race of customers may
affect how they will be treated while shopping. 8 Customers of color
may face heightened surveillance and accusations of theft based on
fairly innocuous behavior. Nonwhite customers may be followed,
stopped, searched, and threatened on such questionable bases as:
looking suspicious, displaying nervous behavior, avoiding sales help,
and shopping in darkened, deserted areas of the store. In this way,
race often becomes a predominant concern in deciding whether to
treat some customers as potential shoplifters. 9 Interactions in retail
settings in which people of color may be reduced to negative stereo-
types reveal the unfortunate reality that racial stereotypes transcend
8. See, e.g., Ronald J. Hensen & Katie Merx, Guard Charged in Mall Death, DETROIT NEWS,
July 7, 2000, at Al. In June 2000, an African-American male, Frederick Finley, shopping with his
eleven-year-old stepdaughter was stopped by Lord & Taylor security guards. The guards ac-
cused the girl of stealing a bracelet and tried to detain Mr. Finley, putting him in a chokehold.
As a result, Mr. Finley died of asphyxia due to suffocation. See Deseriee A. Kennedy, Consumer
Discrimination: The Limitations of Federal Civil Rights Protection, 66 Mo. L. REV. 275, 296-97.
See also Caroline E. Mayer, Car-Loan Rates Marked Up More for Blacks, Report Says, WASH.
POST, Oct. 1, 2003, at El (A recent study conducted at Vanderbilt University found that African-
American car buyers financing their car loans through General Motors Acceptance Corporation
(GMAC) are more likely to be charged a dealer markup and to pay more than 2.5 times the
markup amount than white buyers.); GMAC recently settled a class action lawsuit brought by
black consumers that alleged that its lending practices discriminated against black consumers.
Michael Ellis, GM Loan Unit Reaches Deal in Race-Bias Suit, ORLAND SENTINEL, Jan. 31, 2004,
at C3. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. settled a similar lawsuit and Ford, Toyota, and DaimlerChrysler
AG also face charges of discriminatory lending practices. Id.
9. For a more detailed discussion of the history of consumer discrimination, see Kennedy,
supra note 8, at 287-88.
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class. In fact, a participant in a survey on discrimination remarked,
"No matter how affluent and influential, a black person cannot escape
the stigma of being black." 10
III. CONSUMER DISCRIMINATION DOCTRINE
The Civil Rights Acts are inexpertly drafted to accommodate claims
of discrimination in the public sphere outside of public accommoda-
tions. While § 2000(a) of the Civil Rights Act explicitly prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis of race by restaurants, hotels, theaters, gas
stations, and in contracting, it does not specifically prohibit the racial
dimension of the use of heightened scrutiny and surveillance of blacks
in retail settings." As a result, plaintiffs alleging discrimination in re-
tail settings frequently resort to state tort law 12 or seek relief claiming
violation of the right to contract under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.13 Section
1981 prohibits racial discrimination in "mak[ing] and enforc[ing] con-
tracts"'14 and is relied upon by plaintiffs seeking relief for discrimina-
tory treatment in retail settings as well as in places of public
accommodation, such as restaurants, theaters, and gas stations.1 5
10. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 278 (quoting Joe R. Feagin, The Continuing Significance of
Race: Antiblack Discrimination in Public Places, 56 AM. Soc. REV. 101, 107 (1991)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1)-(4) (2000).
12. Plaintiffs often rely on common law tort claims such as false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and state anti-discrimination statutes.
Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 2001) (false imprisonment and
malicious prosecution); Ackaa v. Tommy Hilfiger, Co., No. 96-8262, 1998 WL 136522 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 24, 1998) (Pennsylvania Human Relations Act). However, dismissal of a plaintiff's federal
claims often results in federal courts declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
state claims under 29 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000). See, e.g., Chu v. Gordmans, Inc., No. 8:01CV182,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26623 (D. Neb. Apr. 12, 2002) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress); Singh v. Wal-Mart, No.
98-1613, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8531 (E.D. Pa. June 10, 1999) (disposing of all state claims after
granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the federal claims). Moreover, fed-
eral courts that have reviewed intentional infliction of emotional distress claims often find that
the alleged conduct is not sufficiently extreme and outrageous. See, e.g., Baltimore-Clark v.
Kinko's, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 695, 701 (D. Md. 2003) (Kinko's employee's commenting that
"'black people don't look right on pink paper' ... does not meet the threshold for extreme and
outrageous conduct required to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under
Maryland law").
13. Plaintiffs also attempt to articulate claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). These claims
frequently fail. See Youngblood, 266 F.3d at 853; Morris v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 277 F.3d
743, 746 (5th Cir. 2001); Lewis v. J.C. Penney, Co., 948 F. Supp. 367, 368 (D. Del. 1996).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
15. See Arguello, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18471; Mendez v. Pizza Hut of Amer., Inc., No. 02 C
1819, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19231 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2002); Thomas v. Nat'l Amusements, Inc.,
No. 98-71215, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5188 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 24, 1999).
992 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:989
Jurisdictions vary in the breadth of their interpretation of the pro-
tections afforded consumer discrimination plaintiffs under § 1981. In
order to state a prima facie claim of race discrimination in the making
or enforcing of contracts under § 1981, plaintiffs in the majority of
jurisdictions must allege: (1) they are members of a racial minority;
(2) the discrimination against them was on account of race; (3) the
discrimination was intentional; and (4) the discrimination was directed
toward one or more of the activities protected by the statute. 16 Most
plaintiffs seeking to articulate a claim for retail discrimination under
§ 1981 face two primary difficulties: establishing to the satisfaction of
the court that the treatment they received was on account of race and,
therefore, evidence of discrimination, 17 and that the discrimination
was directed toward one or more of the activities protected by the
statute.18 Because the statute protects contractual rights, the disputed
issues in a majority of consumer discrimination cases are the nature,
scope, and breadth of the contractual rights of retail consumers.
As a primary matter, plaintiffs must establish that the experiences
that form the basis of their complaint are a result of racial discrimina-
tion. Claims of retail discrimination most often involve one-time en-
counters to which there are few, if any, witnesses. As a result,
demonstrating discriminatory intent in the consumer setting often be-
comes an issue of credibility in which the plaintiff's assessment and
16. Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Garrett v. Tandy
Corp., 295 F.3d 94, 98-99 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing the Morris test with approval); Chu, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26623 (adopting the prima facie test set forth in the text and relied on in the Sec-
ond, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits); Hampton v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 247 F.3d 1091
(10th Cir. 2001). Circuits disagree with whether to apply the burden-shifting framework of Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to consumer discrimination cases. Circuits
that adhere to the burden-shifting framework shift the burden of production to the defendant to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions after the plaintiff articulates a
prima facie case of discrimination. The plaintiff must then prove that the rationale offered by
the defendant is a pretext for discrimination. See Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d
862, 868 (6th Cir. 2001).
17. Morris, 277 F.3d at 752 n.7 (noting but not addressing district court finding that plaintiff
failed to offer evidence that she was discriminated against because of her race); Singh, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8531 (granting motion for summary judgment when plaintiff failed to show inten-
tional discrimination based on race); Jackson v. Tyler's Dad's Place, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 53 (D.D.C.
1994); Roberts v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 1086, 1088 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (Retailer's
practice of noting race of customer on the back of checks did not discriminate against black
customers since there was no evidence cashiers recorded the race of blacks disproportionately to
whites.).
18. There is considerable debate about what consumer-related activities are protected by the
statute. See Garrett, 295 F.3d at 93; Morris, 89 F.3d at 413; Arguello, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18471; Shawl v. Dillards, Inc., 17 Fed. Appx. 908, 911 (10th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001); Bagley v. Amer-
itech Corp., No. 99 C 1449, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18248, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 1999); Wesley
v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (D. Kan. 1999); Ackaa, 1998 WL 136522;
Lewis v. J.C. Penney Co., 948 F. Supp. 367, 371 (D. Del. 1996).
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evaluation of events is directly challenged by the retailer and its em-
ployees. For example, in Singh v. Wal-Mart,19 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary
judgment to the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff failed to es-
tablish that the defendant's actions were racially motivated.20 In
Singh, the court resolved a dispute between Mr. Singh and Wal-Mart
about whether the refusal to accept a return was based on race or the
result of nonracial factors in favor of the defendant. 21 Rejecting the
plaintiff's assertions that Wal-Mart employees refused to accept a re-
turn because of his race, and therefore violated § 1981, the court
found that the plaintiff failed to present evidence to establish that
Wal-Mart's proffered rationale for its employees' actions was pretex-
tual.22 The court concluded: "[O]ne cannot reasonably conclude that
defendant's proffered reason is unbelievable or that defendant more
likely than not refused to give plaintiff a refund on December 20th
because of his race." 23
Second, plaintiffs must establish that the "consumer related" activi-
ties which are the basis of the suit are protected under the statute.
Although the act was amended in 1991 to include "the enjoyment of
all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of the contractual rela-
tionship" in the Act's definition of "mak[ing] and enforce[ing] con-
tracts," most courts continue to define narrowly the protected activ-
ities.24 As a result, courts find a cause of action only in cases in which
plaintiffs were affirmatively denied service, directly prohibited from
completing a contractual transaction,25 or suffered a differential con-
19. 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8531.
20. Id. at *27.
21. Singh, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8531 (Plaintiff Singh describes his nationality as Guyanese
and his race as Asian-Indian.).
22. Id. The court based its decision, in part, on the absence of proof of similarly situated
consumers who were treated differently on account of their race. The Sixth Circuit has noted the
difficulty in obtaining evidence of such "similarly situated" individuals in the commercial con-
text, stating: "By holding plaintiff to the requirement that she produce similarly situated persons
who were not discriminated against, we would be foreclosing other methods of proving inten-
tional discrimination. This test is also particularly onerous because of the difficulty in replicating
a particular shopper's experience." Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 872 (6th
Cir. 2001).
23. Singh, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8531, at *20.
24. See Youngblood, 266 F.3d at 856-57 (Arnold, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1017
(2002) (asserting that majority's affirming of grant of summary judgment to defendant was based
on a "narrow view of the scope of the contract right conferred by § 1981").
25. Hampton v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 247 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming jury ver-
dict for plaintiff who was prevented from redeeming a coupon for a free fragrance sample when
stopped by guard and accused of shoplifting); Henderson v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., No. 96 C
3666, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 1996).
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dition of contracting not placed on whites. 26 While at least a few
courts have applied a broader test of § 1981 that extends the reach of
the statute to the receipt of "services in a markedly hostile manner
and in a manner which a reasonable person would find objectively
discriminatory, 2 7 courts generally reject a broader interpretation of
the Act. Allegations of a hostile or racially discriminatory atmosphere
while shopping, heightened security surveillance, and a general inter-
est in purchasing are usually found insufficient to allow relief.28 Even
plaintiffs who allege that an inability to contract resulted from a ra-
26. See, e.g., Allen v. U.S. Bancorp, 264 F. Supp. 2d 945 (D. Or. 2003) (defendant's motion for
failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) denied where plain-
tiff alleged bank supervisor required him to remove sunglasses but did not require white cus-
tomer to remove their sunglasses); Kelly v. Bank Midwest, N.A., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Kan.
2001) (plaintiff awarded $40,000 in compensatory damages in bench trial where bank subjected
him to heightened scrutiny in applying for a loan including a criminal background check; driving
by his address and calling the police when he arrived at the bank); Hill v. Shell Oil Co., 78 F.
Supp. 2d 764 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (requiring African-American gas customers to prepay placed an
impermissible condition on contracting).
27. See Christian, 252 F.3d at 871 (In reversing the district court's dismissal under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 50, the court found a genuine issue of fact as to whether plaintiff
received services in a markedly hostile manner.); Callwood v. Dave & Buster's, Inc., 98 F. Supp.
2d 694, 703 (D. Md. 2000). The Caliwood court, rather than limiting relief under § 1981 to cases
in which plaintiffs were affirmatively prevented from contracting, stated that plaintiffs must
show that they
[d]id not enjoy the privileges and benefits of the contracted for experience under fac-
tual circumstances which rationally support an inference of unlawful discrimination in
that (a) they were deprived of services while similarly situated persons outside the pro-
tected class were not deprived of these services, and/or (b) they received services in a
markedly hostile manner and in a manner which a reasonable person would find objec-
tively unreasonable.
Id. See also Lizardo v. Denny's, Inc., No. 97-CV-1234 FJS GKD, 2000 WL 976808, at *3 (July 13,
2000).
28. See, e.g., Garrett v. Tandy Corp., 295 F.3d 94 (1st Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the 1991
amendment of § 1981 broadened the reach of the statute, but saying, "Congress did not intend to
convert § 1981 into a general prohibition against race discrimination"); Morris v. Dillard Dep't
Stores, Inc., 277 F.3d 743 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirming Rule 56 dismissal and finding that banning
the plaintiff from store did not constitute loss of an actual contract interest); Shawl v. Dillard's,
Inc., 17 Fed. Appx. 908 (10th Cir. 2001); Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 1996);
Baltimore-Clark v. Kinko's, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 695, 700 (D. Md. 2003) (Section 1981 does not
provide relief for a racially charged contracting experience); Mendez v. Pizza Hut of Amer., Inc.,
No. 02 D 1819, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19231 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2002) (Court granted motion to
dismiss for failure to state claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) stating the
plaintiff cannot maintain a § 1981 claim when the plaintiff was the party responsible for termi-
nating the transaction even if the plaintiff left because of perceived racial animus. A § 1981
plaintiff must allege he or she was prevented-not just deterred-from making a purchase.);
Arguello, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18471; Bagley v. Ameritech, No. 99C 1449, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18248 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 1999); Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D.
Kan. 1999); Hickerson, Ackaa v. Tommy Hilfiger, Co., No 96-8262, 1998 WL 136522 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 24, 1998); Lewis v. J.C. Penney Co., 948 F. Supp. 367, 371-72 (D. Del. 1996); cf Christian,
252 F.3d at 872 (Section 1981 covers a hostile shopping environment).
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cially hostile atmosphere face dismissal of their claims.2 9 In addition,
plaintiffs who are confronted by store personnel after they complete
their transaction30 or are banned from the store by store personnel 31
cannot claim a violation of § 1981 even if the confrontation was ra-
cially motivated.
Section 1981 cases involving consumer discrimination claims are in-
structive in that they demonstrate serious shortcomings in the process
of resolving civil rights claims. 32 The reluctance of courts to accept
plaintiffs' claims of discrimination and the narrow interpretation of
§ 1981 to exclude the disparate treatment of shoppers based on race
that falls short of preventing the completion of a transaction means
that few plaintiffs' civil rights claims have survived until trial. Courts
that adhere to a narrow interpretation of § 1981 in the consumer dis-
crimination context are receptive to defendants' attempts to summa-
rily resolve the cases. These courts are willing to find that plaintiffs
will be unable to establish that they were prevented from engaging in
a protected activity even when plaintiffs assert that they had an inten-
tion to do so, evidenced in part by browsing or other "preshopping"
activities, and they were thwarted by the racially motivated activities
of the defendants. This raises important questions about the appro-
priate role of summary judgment and other pretrial and posttrial mo-
tions in civil rights actions as well as more fundamental questions
about whether the early dismissal of these cases has greater societal
effect, including the impact on the goals of the Civil Rights Acts.33
29. See Mendez, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19231 (Section 1981 claims were dismissed when the
plaintiffs were responsible for terminating the transaction).
30. See Youngblood, 266 F.3d at 854-55; Garrett, 295 F.3d at 101 (accusation of theft and visit
from police at plaintiff's home after purchase does not constitute a violation of § 1981); Rogers
v. Elliot, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1314-15 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (allegations of theft made after purchase
insufficient to articulate § 1981 claim).
31. See Morris, 277 F.3d at 752.
32. Courts rely on a variety of civil procedure devices to eliminate these claims including most
frequently Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals for failure to state a claim,
Rule 56 summary judgment, and Rule 50 judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Mendez, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19231 (granting motion to dismiss for failure to state claim under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6)); Morris, 277 F.3d 743 (Rule 56 dismissal affirmed); Arguello,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18471 (granting Rule 50 motion, vacating jury award finding substandard
service, harassment, disparagement of ethnic background not actionable under § 1981).
33. The Civil Rights Acts were originally passed in large response to efforts by local govern-
ments to restrict the rights and movement of blacks through Black Codes. See DERRICK A.
BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1980). The dissent in Youngblood noted
that "civil rights legislation is designed to address invidious racial discrimination" and reflects
"our society's deep commitment to the eradication of discrimination based on a person's race or
the color of his or her skin." 266 F.3d at 857-58 (Arnold, J., dissenting). A broad interpretation
of § 1981 is consistent with the view that "[t]he application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is not
limited to the fundamental aspects of a contract. Rather, parties are prohibited from discrimi-
2004]
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Pretrial dismissal means that not only are individual plaintiffs denied
the opportunity to recover for their harms, but they are stripped of the
right to publicly present their stories and have them "authenticated,"
create a public record of the events, and have their cases decided by a
jury. Furthermore, the educating function of public litigation is re-
duced when claims are dismissed prematurely.
IV. PREMATURE DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for the involuntary
disposition of matters without trial in a number of ways. 34 Judgment
on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), dismis-
sal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), summary judgment
under Rule 56, and judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 all
permit litigants and the court opportunities to end claims. Summary
judgment allows a party to demonstrate that "there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judg-
ment as a matter of law."'35 The Rule further provides that when a
motion is properly made and supported, the party opposing the mo-
tion may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings
and must respond with materials outside the pleadings that demon-
strate a genuine issue for trial.36 Significant judicial and scholarly de-
bate has centered on the burdens of the moving and nonmoving
parties as well as the appropriate judicial standard for determining
when a court should summarily dismiss claims pursuant to Rule 56.
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.37 is frequently cited in discussions
about the development of application of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 56. In Adickes, a white school teacher from New York, Sandra
Adickes, took her students from a Mississippi Freedom School on a
field trip to the Hattiesburg, Mississippi Public Library.38 The libra-
rian refused to allow the students to use the library and asked them to
leave.39 The librarian called the Hattiesburg chief of police, who ar-
rived and told Ms. Adickes and her students that the library was
nating in 'all phases and incidents of the contractual relationship."' Allen v. U.S. Bancorp, 264 F.
Supp. 2d 945, 948-49 (D. Or. 2003) (quoting Rivers v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1994)).
34. A defendant may move the court to dismiss the claims for failure to state a claim as a
matter of law under Rule 12(b)(6), for a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), or for
summary judgment under Rule 56.
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
37. 398 U.S. 144 (1958).




closed and ordered them to leave. 40 Ms. Adickes then accompanied
her students to Kress's Department Store to eat lunch.41 After the
group sat down to eat, a policeman entered the store and observed the
group.42 A waitress took the children's orders, but refused to serve
Ms. Adickes because "she was a white person 'in the company of Ne-
groes.' ,,43 The group left the store and the policeman who earlier had
been in the store arrested Ms. Adickes on a charge of vagrancy. 44 Ms.
Adickes sued the department store, alleging a violation of her civil
rights under Title 42 of the United States Code, § 1983, alleging a con-
spiracy between the store and the Hattiesburg police. 45 The district
court granted summary judgment on the conspiracy count and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.46
The United States Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary
judgment and remanded.47 The Court found that the plaintiff's cir-
cumstantial evidence was sufficient to create a triable issue of fact and
that the movant had not met its burden of showing the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact.4 8 According to the Court, the plaintiff
"created a substantial enough possibility of a conspiracy to allow her
to proceed to trial, especially given the fact that the noncircumstantial
evidence of the conspiracy could only come from adverse witnesses"
and that the defendant failed to "foreclose the possibility that there
was a policeman in the Kress store while petitioner was awaiting ser-
vice, and that this policeman reached an understanding with some
Kress employee that petitioner not be served. '49 Further, "it would
be open to a jury . . . to infer from the circumstances" that there had
been a meeting of the minds.50
In a concurring opinion, Justice Hugo Black noted the importance
of submitting factual issues to a jury, pointing out the constitutional
dimensions of the right as well as the strategic differences between
trial by affidavit and trial by jury in obtaining just results.51 The ma-
jority and concurring opinions make clear that the 1969 opinion was




43. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 149.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 147.
46. Id. at 148.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 157.
49. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157.
50. Id. at 158-59.
51. Id. at 176.
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role that local governments played in continuing and enforcing segre-
gation as well as the need for federal intervention to protect civil
rights.
Thus, Adickes represents a perception of summary dismissals of ac-
tions before trial as exceptions and disfavored in cases with great pub-
lic policy implications like civil rights claims.52 This judicial reluctance
to deny litigants an opportunity to try their cases remained fairly un-
disturbed until the 1980s, when the Supreme Court decided three
cases that altered the summary judgment motion analysis and applica-
tion.5 3 A series of Supreme Court cases beginning in 1986, Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,54 Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc.,55 and Celotex v. Catrett,56 led to an expanded use of sum-
mary judgment to dispose of cases before trial.5 7
In Matsushita, American television set manufacturers brought suit
against Japanese consumer electronics manufacturers, alleging anti-
trust violations. 58 The district court granted summary judgment for
the Japanese defendants and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit reversed the summary judgment. 59 The Supreme
Court reversed, finding that the court of appeals failed to apply the
proper summary judgment standard.60 According to the Court, the
nonmoving party has the burden of presenting "specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. '61 Finding neither any direct
evidence of a conspiracy nor any "rational economic motive to con-
spire," the Court concluded that the proffered evidence was insuffi-
cient to create a genuine issue for trial under Rule 56.62 The dissent
pointed out that the Court reached this conclusion despite expert evi-
dence shown by the plaintiffs, which offered an analysis of the harms
suffered by the plaintiffs as a result of the defendants' anticompetitive
behavior.63
52. Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1897, 1905, 1907 (1998).
53. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judg-
ment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 79 (1990).
54. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
55. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
56. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
57. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of
Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIo ST. L.J. 95, 99
(1988).
58. Id. at 577.
59. Id. at 579-80.
60. Id. at 582.
61. Id. at 587.
62. Id. at 597.
63. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 601.
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Anderson involved a summary judgment motion in a libel suit filed
by a public official. 64 A series of articles published by Investigator
magazine portrayed the plaintiffs, Liberty Lobby, Inc. and Willis
Carto, as neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and fascist.65 The plaintiffs al-
leged that the articles were false and defamatory and the defendant
filed a motion for summary judgment. The Court analogized the stan-
dard for deciding motions for summary judgment with those for di-
rected verdicts under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50.66 In so
doing, the Court maintained: "The primary difference between the
two motions is procedural. ' 67 The Court reasoned that the substan-
tive law identifies what is material for the purposes of determining
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact.68 The Court found
that the heightened evidentiary requirement in defamation cases in-
volving public officials-that actual malice be proved by "clear and
convincing" evidence-is required at the summary judgment level. 69
The Court directed district courts, in ruling on summary judgment
motions, to "view the evidence presented through the prism of the
substantive evidentiary burden, ' 70 and to "bear in mind the actual
quantum and quality of proof necessary to support liability under New
York Times."71 The Court explicitly rejected the implication in Justice
William Brennan's dissent that doing so denigrates the role of the jury
or authorizes trial on affidavits.72 Thus, although "the movant has the
burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of fact, the plaintiff is
not thereby relieved of his own burden of producing in turn evidence
that would support a jury verdict. ' 73
Celotex, decided the same day as Anderson, involved a wrongful
death suit in which the plaintiff alleged that exposure to the defen-
dant's asbestos products was the proximate cause of the decedent's
injuries. 74 The Court in Celotex held that summary judgment can
properly be entered against "the party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case, on which the party will bear the burden of proof at
64. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
65. Id. at 244-45.
66. Id. at 250-51.
67. Id. at 251.
68. Id. at 248.
69. Id. at 247.
70. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 255, 266.
73. Id. at 256.
74. Id. at 319.
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trial."'75 The Court further asserted that the movant is not required to
support its motion with evidence negating the opponent's claim; it is
sufficient, according to the Court, for the moving party to point out to
the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party's case.76
Taken together, the trilogy has made it easier for a movant to bring
a motion for summary judgment, and more likely that a district court
will grant the motion.77 Matsushita suggests that courts may inquire as
to motive and intent when disposing of implausible claims. Anderson
imposes the same standard of proof necessary at trial on summary
judgment motions, requiring the nonmovant to provide the court with
affirmative evidence supporting its claims and equating summary
judgment motions with Rule 50 motions for judgment as a matter of
law.78 Finally, Celotex requires the movant only to show an absence of
evidence. The summary judgment trilogy has altered the summary
judgment standard reflected in Adickes and the frequency of the use
of pretrial motions to dispose of claims before trial.79 Despite rhetoric
by the Court to the contrary, the trilogy represents a drastically differ-
ent view of the role and scope of summary judgment than that repre-
sented in Adickes.80 Furthermore, at least one scholar has suggested
that the trilogy approach to summary judgment has infected the use of
other summary dismissals mechanisms, such as Rule 12(b)(6) dismis-
sals for failure to state a claim, Rule 12(c) motions for judgment on
the pleadings, and Rule 50 motions for judgment as a matter of law,
and has encouraged courts to impose a higher standard than would
seem required under the Rules.8'
Reviews of the trilogy and subsequent summary judgment results
reveal a wide-ranging critique of the effect the cases may have on liti-
gation and litigants' rights. Many scholars and judges applaud the
changes and assert systemic benefits.82 Others have suggested that the
75. Id. at 322.
76. Id. at 324-25.
77. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion, " "Liabil-
ity Crisis, " and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78
N.Y.U. L. REv. 982, 984 (2003).
78. On a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court must construe the case in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant and find that "there is no legallly sufficient evidentiary basis
for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." See FED. R. Civ. P. 50; Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
79. Wald, supra note 52, at 1914; Miller, supra note 77, at 984.
80. Wald, supra note 52, at 1914; Miller, supra note 77, at 984.
81. Miller, supra note 77, at 1073.
82. Id. at 1044. A related issue is the use of a heightened pleading standard in civil rights
claims that makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to articulate legally cognizable consumer dis-
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post-trilogy approach may contribute to the high incidence of cases
resolved before trial.83 In fact, Judge Patricia Wald has stated: "Fed-
eral jurisprudence is largely the product of summary judgment in civil
cases."' 84 Commentators also question whether the appropriate divi-
sion of duties between judge and jury is being respected by the in-
creasing reliance on summary procedures to dispose of plaintiffs'
claims as well as the overall effect of removing these cases from the
province of juries.8 5 These concerns include an effort to preserve the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial,86 and whether courts are
respecting fairly the appropriate division of duties between judges and
juries.87 Additionally, observers raise concerns about the inability of
the bench to fairly represent a diversity of views and community val-
ues.88 The modern approach to resolving summary judgment motions
may be more likely to affect plaintiffs adversely rather than defend-
ants. 89 In fact, Professors Samuel Issacharoff and George Loewen-
stein's analysis of summary judgment cases supports the conclusion
that "summary judgment is a defendant's motion." 90 It has also been
crimination claims that can survive a pretrial dismissal. Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of
Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 1027-32 (2003).
83. Judge Wald notes the high incidence of cases terminated before trial in the District Court
for the District of Columbia and asserts that "despite the high profile that 'alternative dispute
resolution' has enjoyed... summary judgment may in fact be the more commonly used mode of
disposition on the merits, outnumbering settlement by court-annexed arbitrations, mediation,
early neutral evaluation, and other settlement techniques." Wald, supra note 52, at 1915.
84. Id.
85. See Miller, supra note 77, at 1074-75.
86. Stempel, supra note 57, at 162 (suggesting the trilogy caused a "shift of power from juries
to judges in derogation of the Seventh Amendment); but see Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Sum-
mary Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in Standards, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770,
770-72 (1988) (arguing that so long as the summary judgment process is fair and comports with
due process standards, there are no constitutional violations of a right to trial by jury).
87. Miller, supra note 77, at 1076; Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Tril-
ogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VH and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV.
203, 206 (1993); Linda S. Mullenix, Summary Judgment: Taming the Beast of Burdens, 10 AM. J.
TRIAL ADvoc. 433, 460 (1987) (noting that Matsushita transforms summary judgment proceed-
ings into mini-trials).
88. M. Isabel Medina, A Matter of Fact: Hostile Environments and Summary Judgments, 8 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 311, 358-61 (1999) (arguing that the increased reliance of dis-
trict courts on summary judgment to dispose of sexual harassment cases hampers the ability of
juries to contribute community and workplace values to Title VII doctrine); Stempel, supra note
57, at 166 (stating that juries infuse community standards into litigation, promote public confi-
dence in the judicial system and fairness of litigation results, and maintain democratic values and
citizen access).
89. Wald, supra note 52, at 1925-26; McGinley, supra note 87, at 207-08.
90. Issacharoff & Lowenstein, supra note 53, at 92. The professors' research supports the
conclusion that defendants file more summary judgment motions than plaintiffs and defendants'
motions are granted more frequently. Id. The result is to alter "the balance of power between
plaintiffs and defendants in the pretrial phases of litigation by raising both the costs and risks to
plaintiffs at the summary judgment stage while diminishing both for defendants." Id. at 93.
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asserted that this creates a wealth advantage because "[d]efendants
are disproportionately comprised of society's 'haves' . . . [and]
[p]laintiffs are disproportionately comprised of society's 'have
nots."'91 Furthermore, Judge Wald posits that trial judges may be us-
ing pretrial dismissal rules to terminate "cases they don't think are
worth trying. '92 Unfortunately, this frequently includes cases that in-
volve novel issues of law as well as those cases in which factual evi-
dence is not readily available to the plaintiff without discovery. 93
Consumer discrimination cases exemplify many of the concerns that
critics have raised about the post-trilogy approach to summary judg-
ment.94 Plaintiffs may be discouraged from bringing consumer dis-
crimination claims under § 1981, thereby inhibiting the development
of the doctrine to address consumer discrimination claims. The pre-
trial dismissal of consumer discrimination claims may also reflect an
under-valuing of the claims that permits district court judges to re-
solve credibility and motivation issues before trial.
The aggressive use of pretrial dismissal of claims may deter plain-
tiffs from bringing consumer discrimination claims. The relative cost
of defending pretrial dismissal motions falls disproportionately on the
nonmovant or plaintiff,95 which may discourage plaintiffs from assert-
ing consumer discrimination claims under which their right to relief
may be uncertain. Although seeking relief under § 1981 has historical
roots, its use in retail settings by plaintiffs seeking redress for con-
91. Stempel, supra note 57, at 161.
92. Wald, supra note 52, at 1937.
93. Id. at 1943-44.
94. Commentators have questioned the impact of modern summary judgment principles on a
variety of substantive areas. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall
for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99, 101 (1999) (examining ADA appellate employ-
ment discrimination cases and concluding that "courts are abusing the summary judgment device
and failing to defer to agency guidance in interpreting the ADA"); Medina, supra note 88, at 358
(sexual harassment); see also Wald, supra note 52, at 1916. Wald states:
Marching under the Celotex banner, summary judgment has respected none of the
boundaries of those sovereign territories which for so long had been thought immune
from its invasions .... Freedom of Information Act and Privacy act cases, administra-
tive law cases involving bank insolvency, insurance company liability cases, Federal
Tort Claims Act cases, Federal Reserve Board regulation cases, libel, and defamation
cases, federal election law disputes, Title VII cases alleging racially discriminatory em-
ployment actions, arbitration reviews in labor disputes, class actions based on allegedly
miscalculated interest rates on home mortgages, cases involving alleged violations of
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, constitutional tort claims
brought by prisoners, airline claims for reimbursement from the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service, Federal Advisory Committee Act cases, and disparate-impact claims
based on statistical evidence, brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act.
Id.
95. Miller, supra note 77, at 1043.
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sumer discrimination is a fairly recent occurrence. 96 Recent judicial
opinions addressing these claims frequently note the cases as ones of
first impression in their districts or circuits.97 Pretrial dismissal of
these claims hinders the growth and development of § 1981 to address
these claims. Courts that have adopted the narrowest interpretation
largely apply an employment law framework to consumer cases. On
the other hand, circuits that have seen these cases tried have devel-
oped a test for examining the sufficiency of plaintiffs' claims. That test
appears to be better suited for the context in which many of these
cases arise. As the Sixth Circuit in Christian v. Wal-Mart98 aptly
noted, the employment law approach fails to address the factual dif-
ferences between employment and consumer discrimination cases, re-
sulting in the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims because they are unable
to articulate cognizable causes of action.99 A standard that allows
plaintiffs to seek relief for a racially hostile environment in commer-
cial settings represents a more nuanced approach that is more consis-
tent with the policy underlying the original Civil Rights Acts as well as
the 1991 amendments. 100
Judicial response to consumer discrimination claims may stem, in
part, from an undervaluing of the claims. Although each individual
instance of consumer discrimination may involve a fairly small eco-
nomic injury, plaintiffs articulate significant emotional and psycholog-
ical harms as a result of their experiences.101 The impact of being a
96. A recent LEXIS and Westlaw search revealed two consumer discrimination § 1981 cases
before 1990.
97. Morris v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 277 F.3d 743, 748 (5th Cir. 2001); Baltimore-Clark v.
Kinko's, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698-99 (D. Md. 2003) (asserting that reliance on § 1981 for
obtaining relief for consumer discrimination is more rare than its use in employment
discrimination).
98. 252 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2001).
99. Id. at 869-72.
100. Id. at 872-73.
101. See, e.g., Kelly v. Bank Midwest, N.A., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1208 (D. Kan. 2001). The
Kelly court held that being subject to differential conditions based on race caused plaintiff
[a] great deal of embarrassment and humiliation, particularly because plaintiff, an indi-
vidual who has made considerable efforts to "make it" as a business professional, was
treated like a criminal in a place of business where he had gone to transact his business.
He testified that the situation at the bank "overwhelmed" him, left him feeling "de-
feated," and caused him to distrust others and question himself.
Id. Other testimony in that case revealed that plaintiff was "more pessimistic, less self-confident,
and tended to question his ability to interact in the business world ... [had become] 'withdrawn'
• . . more reserved and more hesitant in both business and personal respects." Id. See also
Hampton v. Dillard Stores, Inc., 247 F.3d 1091, 1114-15 (10th Cir. 2001) (The plaintiff testified
that "she felt humiliated and disgraced" by being accused of shoplifting; "she was visibly upset
after the incident," was too distraught to drive herself home, and "is now unable to shop with her
children for fear of future ridicule and humiliation.").
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victim of discrimination is substantial; plaintiffs may be the subject of
numerous instances of having been treated differently because of their
race. The phenomenon of the infusion of racism into the everyday has
been become known as "everyday racism." The sociological study of
everyday racism attempts to demonstrate the links between the struc-
ture and ideology of racism by focusing on the ways in which racism
appears in everyday practices. 10 2 It is designed to draw attention to
how race is experienced in everyday life by focusing on common prac-
tices many take for granted, but which affect the life experiences of
people of color on a daily basis.10 3
Consumer discrimination cases also reflect the willingness of courts
to weigh the credibility of the litigants and motives of the defendants
pretrial. Credibility is most clearly relevant in determinations about
whether the defendants were motivated by sound nondiscriminatory
reasons for their treatment of the plaintiffs. 10 4 However, in deciding
as a matter of law that the plaintiffs have not met their burden under
§ 1981 for failing to show that they intended to complete a purchase,
district court judges are, in essence, making credibility judgments re-
garding the defendants' intentions. 10 5 For example, in Morris v. Office
Max, Inc.,106 the plaintiffs alleged that approximately one minute after
they arrived at an Office Max store, the store manager summoned the
police to report "two male blacks acting suspiciously. ' 10 7 The plain-
tiffs alleged that they were in the process of shopping for a time stamp
among other items when they were stopped and questioned by the
police. The court found that there was no § 1981 violation, stating
that although plaintiffs "assert that the encounter with the police
caused them to "los[e] interest in the time stamps, they produced no
evidence to suggest that they had anything more than a general inter-
102. PHILOMENA ESSED, UNDERSTANDING EVERYDAY RACISM, AN INTERDISCIPLINARY THE-
ORY 2 (1991).
103. Social scientist Philomena Essed defines everyday racism as those "systematic, recurrent,
familiar practices" and "socialized attitudes and behavior" that "transcend the traditional dis-
tinctions between institutional and individual racism." Id. at 3, 37.
104. See Singh v. Wal-Mart, No. 98-1613, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8531 (E.D. Pa. June 10, 1999)
(concluding that the plaintiff failed to show a refusal to permit the return of purchased merchan-
dise was on account of race); Roberts v. Wal-Mart, 769 F. Supp. at 1088 (finding that there was
no evidence that the practice of recording a customer's race on the back of a check was racially
motivated).
105. Garrett v. Tandy Corp., 295 F.3d 94, at 102 (1st Cir. 2001) (While recognizing that "the
right to return merchandise is incident to and, thus, part of, the prototypical retail contract,"
plaintiff's assertion that racially motivated accusation of shoplifting deterred him from returning
merchandise was rejected by the court as a "theoretical loss of a possible future opportunity to
modify the contract.").
106. 89 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 1996).
107. Id. at 412.
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est in that merchandise."'1 08 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs failed to show that
they were prevented from making a purchase, stating, "The men failed
to demonstrate that they would have attempted to purchase the time
stamps even if they had not been approached by the police."10 9
Similarly, the court in Arguello v. Conoco, Inc. found no § 1981 vio-
lation despite construing the facts to find that plaintiffs Denise Ar-
guello and her father were "harassed, insulted, and disparaged ... due
to [their] ethnic background."' 10 Arguello alleged that a Conoco gas
station cashier used the store's intercom to scream racist remarks at
her, and, at some point during the altercation, locked the entry to the
store, preventing her father from reentering. "1 The district court en-
tered judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 in favor of the de-
fendants, vacating a $550,000 jury award to Arguello and her father.
The court found that § 1981 was not violated because Arguello was
not prevented from completing a sales transaction and purchasing
goods.1 12 The court reached this conclusion despite testimony from
the plaintiffs that they intended to purchase items, but did not because
of the Conoco employee's behavior. 113 The court concluded that the
plaintiffs' refusal to purchase was voluntary and they were not actu-
ally prevented from making their purchase.1 14 The court reached this
conclusion without discussing whether locking the plaintiffs out of the
store constituted a violation under § 1981.
Not only does this approach so narrowly construe the federal stat-
ute so as to make it difficult for plaintiffs to articulate a legally cogni-
zable claim," 5 but it discounts the plaintiffs' assertions that they
108. Id. at 414.
109. Id.
110. Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., No. 3:97-CV-0638-H, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18471, at *10
(N.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2001).
111. Id. at *2-3.
112. Id. at *10.
113. Id. at *11.
114. Id.
115. See Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 872 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Call-
wood v. Dave & Buster's, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 694, 705 (D. Md. 2000). A narrow construction of
§ 1981 also results in courts dissecting plaintiff's claims in a way that artificially separates histori-
cal facts about discrimination and discriminatory treatment of shoppers from facts concerning
whether a contractual right was violated. This approach may lead to significant facts relating to
nature of discrimination being excised from the courts' discussion which then narrowly focuses
on whether the case involved the violation of a protected activity. For example, in Youngblood
v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., the dissent noted that in detaining the plaintiff for shoplifting and in
response to a request from the plaintiff for the return of goods for which he already paid for, the
defendant's employee stated, "You and your people have to pay back double the amount." 266
F.3d 851, 858 (8th Cir. 2001) (Arnold, J., dissenting).
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would have completed a purchase absent the racially motivated inter-
ference by store personnel, and thus draws inferences in favor of the
defendant retailer.116 Courts appear to suggest a level of implausibil-
ity of plaintiffs' allegations 17 and to require a level of proof of intent
and motivation that is nearly impossible for these plaintiffs to provide,
particularly at the pretrial stage.118 The courts that take this approach
seem to suggest that it is improper to allow juries to determine
whether plaintiffs were prevented from completing a purchase absent
concrete evidence of a store's refusal to accept payment. In this way,
the court's narrow construction of the "making and enforcing con-
tracts" section of the statute may well be about the perceived lack of
credibility of plaintiffs.1 19
V. SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE
Some social science research supports giving considerable credence
to assertions of discrimination articulated by people of color because
they are often uniquely situated to recognize racism in its increasingly
more covert forms. Having gained a body of knowledge about racism
directly through personal experiences, the experiences of others, aca-
demic study,120 and the media, blacks and others who experience race-
based discrimination have developed some specialized knowledge
about racism and may be uniquely equipped to recognize and identify
its occurrence.' 21
While many may have a general or academic knowledge of racism,
the study of everyday racism suggests that those who have exper-
ienced racism have a heightened ability to identify and analyze race-
based events.' 22 This specialized knowledge gains its unique strength
in part from the fact that this knowledge is not static and is "continu-
116. See Miller, supra note 77, at 1064.
117. Id.
118. See Christian, 252 F.3d at 872; see also Callwood, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 705.
119. Ackaa v. Tommy Hilfiger, Co., No. 96-8262 1998 WL 136522, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24,
1998) (§ 1981 claims dismissed on summary judgment even though plaintiffs were banned from
store, finding there was no evidence that plaintiffs wished to return any of the merchandise they
purchased or were prevented from entering the store).
120. The need for expert testimony to understand the nature and manifestations of racism and
racist events is recognized in Sawyer v. Southwest Airlines, Co., in which the court overruled the
granting of a motion in limine to defendant, excluding expert testimony as to the historical
meaning of a phrase alleged to be racist. 243 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1268 (D. Kan. 2003).
121. ESSED, supra note 102, at 3, 9, 58.
122. Essed does not maintain that those who have not experienced racism cannot identify or
understand racism, only that first-hand experience with racism creates a specialized knowledge
and heightened awareness. She asserts that those who may not have personal experiences with
racism can gain a greater understanding and awareness of its manifestations through various
means including academic study. Id.
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ally tested, adapted, and also structured by information from the so-
cial context. 1 23 Furthermore, it assumes that repeat exposure to
racism heightens awareness of the events and may sharpen the ability
to recognize and analyze the relevant events. 124 Their experiences are
necessarily multifaceted and may include personal experiences,
knowledge of the experience of others such as family and friends, wit-
nessing racist events, as well as a more general knowledge of racism
that is based on academic study and the media. 125 This approach chal-
lenges assumptions that an understanding of racism is primarily emo-
tive and reactionary, and suggests a more scientific process at work to
analyze potentially race-based events. 12 6 Stopping short of identifying
a formula that may be used to deconstruct relevant events, sociologist
Philomena Essed suggests that those experienced in identifying racism
carefully process the events, essentially applying a weighing or balanc-
ing test that allows an interpreter "to pose the relevant questions and
to make goal-directed inferences and observations to substantiate the
evaluation that racism is involved in that particular situation." 127
"The more information about and more practice with the problem of
racism one has, the more abstract, complex, and organized representa-
tions of racism become and the more sensitively this knowledge can
be used in memory storage and retrieval."'128
Thus, the variety of vantage points from which blacks, for example,
can gain knowledge about racism makes them particularly well-suited
to recognize discrimination when it occurs. In fact, Essed maintains,
through prolonged practice in dealing with racism, people become ex-
perts. This means that their general knowledge of racism becomes or-
ganized in more and more complex ways, and their interpretive
strategies become more elaborate and effective."' 129 Further, "highly
involved subjects follow more complicated information processing
procedures. They appear to be sensitive to schema-consistent as well
as schema-inconsistent data in the processing of new information,
123. Id. at 72.
124. Id. at 119.
125. Id. at 4-5.
126. Id. at 120. "In many situations Black women are the only witnesses to racism. Yet their
point of view is often dismissed as 'subjective' and, therefore invalid. Radically breaking with
this perspective I will show that accounts of racism are not ad hoc stories. They have a specific
structure based on rational testing and argumentation." ESSED, supra note 102, at 120.
127. Id. at 117.
128. Id. at 76.
129. Id. at 74.
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whereas low-involvement subjects are more inclined to remember
only schema-consistent information. '130
Despite an apparent wealth of subjective and objective knowledge
of race, the identification of covert racism by people of color is often
ignored or met with skepticism and doubt.131 Part of the reluctance of
many to identify racism may also stem from the extent to which en-
countered events mirror our expectations. 132 Essed suggests that any
apparent unwillingness to give credence to allegations of racism made
by people of color may have a number of sources. It may be due, in
part, to the reluctance of many to admit to unconscious stereotyping
due to race, despite significant social science data to support a ten-
dency of people to stereotype on the basis of race. Significant moral,
political, and legal pressures exist to denounce racism, at least in its
more blatant forms. 133 Finally, many continue to associate moral cul-
pability with racism and are reluctant to ascribe racially-based motiva-
tions to actors whom they consider to be "good people."'134
VI. JURIES, JUDGES, DIVERSITY, AND FAIRNESS
In cases involving allegations of discrimination, scholars raise multi-
ple concerns about the increased use of summary judgment, including
that it may infringe upon the Seventh Amendment right to jury trials,
that it may not fairly respect the division of duties between judge and
jury, and that it inadequately represents community values. Critiques
of the lack of diversity of the federal judiciary magnify those concerns.
130. Id. (citing S.T. FISKE & D.R. KINDER, INVOLVEMENT, EXPERTISE, AND SCHEMA USE:
EVIDENCE FROM POLITICAL COGNITION (1981)).
131. Essed remarks that "generally little attention has been paid to the knowledge, beliefs,
opinions, and attitudes of Blacks with respect to the meaning of racism." Id. at 7. Essed sug-
gests that any apparent unwillingness to give credence to allegations of racism made by people in
color may have a number of sources. It may be due, in part, to the reluctance of many to admit
to unconscious stereotyping due to race despite significant social science data to support a ten-
dency of people to stereotype on the basis of race. There are also significant moral, political, and
legal pressures exist to denounce racism, at least in its more blatant forms. ESSED, supra note
102, at 58-59. Finally, many continue to associate moral culpability with racism and are reluctant
to ascribe racially-based motivations to actors whom they consider to be "good people." Id. at
159.
132. Stereotypes about people and groups may work to help us test our understanding of
events in ways which are consistent with our understanding of the world. Scholars across disci-
plines have wrestled with stereotypes. Particularly difficult to unravel are the ways in which
stereotypical thinking and assumptions affect behavior resulting in discriminatory actions. The
law has struggled with how to recognize and root out stereotypes that result in unlawful discrimi-
natory conduct in a number of contexts. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Nev. Dep't of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
133. ESSED, supra note 102, at 59.
134. Id.
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The aggressive use of pretrial motions in discrimination cases allows
a judge who may be unable to comprehend the nature of the harms
alleged in the complaint to prematurely terminate a plaintiff's right to
seek relief.135 This concern is supported by critiques of the federal
judiciary as "a powerful tenured institution that is overwhelmingly
white, male, and upper-middle class."'1 36 In her analysis of racial di-
versity on the bench, Professor Sherrilyn Ifill has noted that only 3.3%
of the judges on our nation's federal, state, and local courts are Afri-
can American, and over 90% of all federal appellate judges are
white.137 Moreover, the reality of the extent and nature of racial seg-
regation in America today suggests that white judges may lack the
experiences to be able to recognize the legal harms articulated in a
consumer discrimination complaint.138 That is, their experiences may
have left them without the perspectives and values needed to identify
sufficiently with the plaintiff's story so as to find the existence of a
legal claim able to survive a pretrial motion. In fact, it is very likely
that these are the same stores in which white upper-class males (like
judges) shop without incident. Thus, the lived experiences of the
judges directly contrast with those of the plaintiffs in consumer dis-
crimination cases. Substantial social science data, for example, sup-
ports the conclusion that whites and blacks have vastly different
experiences and perspectives on issues relating to race and racial dis-
crimination-including differing definitions of discrimination. 139
These contrasting perspectives on race must necessarily affect the in-
terpretation given to a set of facts in which the plaintiffs allege racially
discriminatory treatment in retail settings.
On the other hand, presenting the facts to juries not only permits
plaintiffs the opportunity to tell their story and to receive the valida-
tion that comes with that opportunity, but presents a greater possibil-
135. See, e.g., Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 851, 858 (8th Cir. 2001) (Ar-
nold, J., dissenting).
136. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confi-
dence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 407 (2000).
137. Id. at 407 n.3.
138. Id. at 424-25.
139. Social science data supports findings that "whites are less likely to perceive racial dis-
crimination" and believe that blacks are paranoid about racial discrimination and frequently
attribute racial motives to actions when there are none." Kennedy, supra note 8, at 325. Whites
tend to have a more narrow definition of racism than blacks, restricting discrimination primarily
to intentional bad acts and viewing blacks as over-sensitive about racial issues. Similarly, blacks
themselves tend to discount discriminatory events and "often evaluate a situation carefully
before judging it discriminatory and taking additional action." In fact, some blacks may be "so
sensitive to white charges of hypersensitivity and paranoia that they err in the opposite direction




ity that a juror will connect with a plaintiff's experience in a way that
the bench may not connect. Naturally more diverse and representa-
tive than the pool of judges, members of the jury may be better
equipped to recognize a plaintiff's harm. For example, in Hampton v.
Dillard,140 a consumer discrimination case against Dillard Department
Stores, the plaintiff, having survived summary judgment, was given
the opportunity to tell the jury her story and to express her rage and
pain as a result of the treatment she received. 141 Perhaps members of
the jury shared similar experiences or had a shared cultural history
from which they could draw upon to assess the credibility of the plain-
tiff, the likelihood that the treatment she received was on account of
race, and the magnitude of the harm, because not only did the jury
find in favor of the plaintiff, awarding her $56,000 in compensatory
and $1.1 million in punitive damages, but at the end of the trial, the
jury foreperson came up to the plaintiff and kissed her on the
forehead.1 42
VII. PUBLIC TELLING/AUTHENTICATION
As examples of ways in which everyday racism subtly affects oppor-
tunities and experiences of people of color, stories of consumer racism
serve an important documenting function. While media reports publi-
cize stories of consumer racism, these reports lack the legitimacy and
public imprimatur provided by recorded decisions. When courts dis-
pose of these claims through pretrial motions, they engage in silencing
affected groups not only insofar as they prevent a plaintiff from mov-
ing forward in the litigation, but also in communicating the legitimacy
of the plaintiff's claims-they declare, in essence, that blacks who suf-
fer discriminatory surveillance and scrutiny do not have a claim that
the law is bound to recognize. 143
Prematurely disposing of consumer discrimination cases based on
the unwillingness to recognize that the events describe a legally cogni-
zable harm insulates the stores from liability and labels the behavior
140. 247 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 2001).
141. Id.
142. See McGinley, supra note 87, at 208-09 (noting the aggressive use of summary judgment
in civil rights cases "even though these cases most often turn on subtle questions of credibility
and intent that only a factfinder faced with a live witness should decide").
143. A narrow construction of § 1981 has been criticized as not fairly recognizing the need for
a broad interpretation of the statute "in keeping with its remedial purpose" and a broader inter-
pretation has been advocated as consistent with the goals of the Civil Rights Acts as articulated
by the court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Harlan's dissent in Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 851, 858
(8th Cir. 2001) (Arnold, J., dissenting).
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as nondiscriminatory. Furthermore, it devalues African Americans'
cumulative experiences, knowledge, and unique ability to interpret
events and judge whether they are racial in nature. Finally, the pre-
mature disposal of consumer discrimination claims prevents a discus-
sion of the events, their meaning, and their import in a public forum.
Pretrial disposal of these cases also limits the ability of plaintiffs to
create a full public record of the events. Even cases in which plaintiffs
are unsuccessful at trial create important public and historical records
that not only document the events, but serve as markers by which we
can judge racial progress or regression or political rights and social
change. Thus, cases like Dred Scott 44 and Plessy v. Ferguson145 are
important to our understanding of racial oppression and the history of
race in America. They are, in many respects, memorials to the plain-
tiffs and records of a constitutional analysis limited by a narrow per-
spective blind to the racial realities of the times. Early dismissal of
these consumer discrimination cases often means the events are not
being recorded in a way that will allow them to serve as public
markers.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The general concerns raised about the increasing use of summary
dismissal procedures to dispose plaintiffs' claims are illustrated by
cases involving consumer discrimination allegations. The premature
dismissal of these claims makes difficult the development of the Civil
Rights Act to address fairly commercial transactions and demon-
strates the willingness of courts to make credibility determinations in
summary proceedings that are frequently decided in favor of defend-
ants. The post-trilogy summary judgment standard, coupled with the
narrow interpretation of § 1981, makes it difficult for plaintiffs to ar-
ticulate claims that can survive summary dismissal. There are compel-
ling reasons to broaden the reach of § 1981 to include "hostile
environment" cases and to apply an Adickes-type summary judgment
standard to a category of cases involving complex issues of fact and
law, cases that raise issues of great public import. Civil rights cases, in
particular, deserve the deference provided to plaintiffs under the pre-
trilogy approach to engage in full discovery to the extent permitted
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and to have their cases
tried before a jury. Any dangers that might result from relaxing the
standard for summary judgment in civil rights claims would be largely
144. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
145. 163 U.S. 537.
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systemic: increasing frivolous lawsuits, decreasing judicial efficacy,
and increasing litigation costs by flooding the federal docket. Serious
questions have been raised about whether these systemic concerns are
grounded in fact 146 and whether the substantive benefits of allowing
these claims to go forward outweigh systemic concerns, given the im-
portance of civil rights litigation. Statistics tend to show that judges
frequently agree with jury decisions and there are sufficient means
under the Rules for judges to amend incorrect jury decisions at trial
and on appeal to limit harm to potential defendants.147 The value to
individual plaintiffs and to the development of antidiscrimination
principles in law and society outweigh any potential for an increase in
federal dockets. 148
146. See Miller, supra note 77, at 992-96.
147. Stempel, supra note 57, at 165 (asserting that, despite studies which establish that judges
and juries reach similar results, the processes they use to reach their conclusions differ in "that
the jury introduces elements of flexibility and equity in the application of otherwise rigid rules of
law").
148. See Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 53, at 73 (noting the expanded use of sum-
mary judgment as a response to docket pressures on the federal judiciary); but see Friedenthal,
supra note 86, at 779 (arguing that a return to Adickes would "unnecessarily cripple the use of
summary judgment" while noting the relevance of the civil rights issues to the denial of the
summary judgment motion in the case). Professor Stempel questions the efficiency of the con-
temporary summary judgment standard. Stempel, supra note 57, at 170-72.
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